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I.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The new draft Panama Canal Treaties signed by President
Carter and General Omar Torrijos on September 7, 1977, are the
culmination of a major effort by both parties to resolve longstanding disputes over the Canal. The trans-isthmian Canal has
been a major concern of United States foreign policy since the
Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of 1850,1 which provided that neither the
United States nor England would take sole control over any such
canal. This bar was removed in 1901 by the Hay-Pauncefote
Treaty, 2 and soon afterwards the United States began negotiations
with Columbia for construction of a canal. After the breakdown of
these negotiations in 1903, the United States indicated it would
not oppose a Panamanian revolution against Columbia.3 In November 1903 a representative of the new Panamanian government
signed the Hay-Bunau Varilla Treaty. 4 Under this Treaty, Panama
granted the United States "in perpetuity the use, occupation and
control of a zone of land and land under water for the construction,
maintenance, operation, sanitation and protection of said Canal
.... "5Panama also granted "all the rights, power and authority
within the zone . . . which the United States would exercise if it
were the sovereign .... ."I Although these perpetuity and sover-

eignty clauses have been read as a cession of Panamanian sovereignty over the Canal Zone, 7 Panama has always contested this
1. April 19, 1850, 9 Stat. 995, T.S. No. 122.
2. Nov. 18, 1901, 32 Stat. 1903, T.S. No. 401.
3. ABA SuBcoMM. ON INT'L WATERWAYS, INTERNATIONAL RIGHTS OF PASSAGE
UNDER A NEW PANAMA CANAL TREATY, 20-22 (1975) [hereinafter cited as ABA
Report].
4. Convention with Panama for the Construction of a Ship Canal to Connect
the Waters of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, Nov. 18, 1903, 33 Stat. 2234, T.S.
No. 431 [hereinafter cited as Hay-Bunau Varilla Treaty].
5. Id. art. 2.
6. Id. art. 3.
7. For the Panamanian view that sovereignty was not ceded, see Guevara,
Negotiating a Peaceful Solution to the PanamaCanal, 9 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL.
3 (1976). For an examination of the imprecise way in which Canal Zone jurisdiction under the Treaty has been handled in United States courts, see Shay, The
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reading of the Treaty and has attempted, unsuccessfully, to modify those clauses.' The failure to accomplish such modification
has been cited as a chief cause of the riots in the Zone in 1964.1
These disturbances, however, did lead to renewed treaty negotiations between the United States and Panama. A proposed draft
treaty was initialed on June 26, 1967,10 but it soon met with heavy
opposition in both countries." Panama objected to the retention of
the perpetuity clause and the failure to commit all disputes to an
impartial tribunal.'" The United States Congress objected to the
creation of an unwieldy "joint administrative body" to run the
Canal and to the provision that the Canal would be turned over to
Panama by the year 2000.13 The failure to reach an agreement led
to a coup in Panama on October 11, 1968. General Omar Torrijos
emerged as the new head of state,'4 and both parties to the Treaty
began new efforts to reach an agreement. On February 7, 1974, a
Joint Statement of negotiating principles was signed.' 5 These prinPanamaCanal Zone: In Search of a JuridicalIdentity, 9 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL.
15 (1976).
8. E.g., Treaty with Panama on Friendship and Cooperation, Mar. 2, 1936,
53 Stat. 1807, T.S. No. 945. Under this treaty, the parties agreed that any response to threats against the Canal's neutrality or security would be subject to
consultation between them.
9. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON THE MERCHANT MARINE AND FISHERIES, REPORT
ON PROBLEMS CONCERNING THE PANAMA CANAL, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (Comm. Print
1970) [hereinafter cited as House Report].
10. Treaty on the Defense of the Panama Canal and of Its Neutrality, initialed
June 26, 1967, reprintedin HousE REPORT, supra note 9, app. 6.
11. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 9, at 4.
12. [T]he greatest cause, the constant cause [of friction with the
United States over the treaties is] ...

the invariable conduct of the Gov-

ernment of the United States of America of interpreting the clauses of the
existing treaties in the manner most convenient to their interests ....
This unilateral decision by the United States would subsist [sic] if
the [1967 draft treaty] ...

were signed, since in the few instances in which

possible arbitrations are foreseen, these deal with matters of a secondary
order but not related to the defense of the sovereignty and dignity of the
Republic.
La Estrella de Panama, Sept. 5, 1970, reprinted in id. at 90, 95. For a discussion
of additional objections to the proposed draft treaty, see id. at 9-10.
13. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 9 at 19-20.
14. Id. at 4-5.
15. Joint Statement by the Honorable Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
of the United States of America, and His Excellency Juan Antonio Tack, Minister
of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Panama, on February 7, 1974 at Panama, 70
DEP'T STATE BULL. 184 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Joint Statement]. See also 7
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 744 (1974).
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ciples called for the abrogation of the 1903 Hay-Bunau Varilla
Treaty, the recognition of Panamanian sovereignty over the Zone,
and the termination of the new treaty at a date to be fixed by its
own terms. These principles were carried over into the new draft
Panama Canal Treaties, which allow the United States to withdraw gradually from Panama without entirely giving up its strategic interest in the Canal. 6

II. DRAFr TREATY TERMS
Article I of the Canal Treaty explicitly declares the abrogation
of the Hay-Bunau Varilla Treaty and all other United StatesPanamanian agreements relating to the Panama Canal. 7 It further
states that "Panama, as territorial sovereign, grants to the United
States of America, for the duration of this treaty, the rights necessary to regulate the transit of ships through the Panama Canal,
and to manage, operate, maintain, improve, protect and defend
the Canal.""' By these terms, the United States clearly abandons
any claim to ultimate sovereignty over the Canal and instead accepts a grant of limited rights for limited purposes. The Treaty will
come into force simultaneously with the Neutrality Treaty, 9 and
will expire by its own terms on December 31, 1999.20 While the
Canal Treaty remains in force, the United States under article IV
retains the "primary responsibility to protect and defend the
canal." The operation and management of the Canal will be entrusted to a new United States government agency, the Panama
Canal Commission, which will operate the Canal in accordance
with rules laid down in article III. The Commission will be supervised by a joint board consisting of five American and four Panamanian nationals. 2' The Commission is required under article XIII
of the Treaty to pay compensation to Panama for the use of the
Canal at the rate of $.30 U.S. per Panama Canal net ton, for
16. Panama ratified the Treaties by a two to one margin in a plebiscite conducted on October 24, 1977, and the Treaties are currently being considered by
the United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Panama Canal Treaty,
Sept. 7, 1977, United States-Panama, reprintedin U.S. DEo'T OF STATE, SELECTED
DOCUMENTS No. 6, at I (Sept. 1977); Treaty Concerning the Permanent Neutrality
and Operation of the Panama Canal, Sept. 7, 1977, United States-Panama,
reprintedin U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, SELECTED Docuzimrrs No. 6, at 13 (Sept. 1977).
17. Canal Treaty, supra note 16, art. 1.

18. Id. art. 1, para. 2.
19.
20.
21.

Id. art. 2, para. 1.
Id. art. 2, para. 2.
Id. art. 3, para. 3.
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each ship which passes through the Canal." Although the Commission will replace the present Panama Canal Company and Canal Zone Government, it will have less power and authority than
its predecessors. For example, municipal services such as fire and
police protection in the Zone will be provided by Panama.2 Furthermore, Panama will exercise territorial jurisdiction over the former Zone by providing courts, postal services, and customs controls.2 4 The United States will no longer exercise sovereign jurisdic-

tion.25 Qualifications on Panamanian jurisdiction are set out in
articles VIII and IX. Article VIII grants immunity to United States
government agencies acting pursuant to the Treaty and allows the
United States to designate up to twenty members of the Canal
Commission who shall be accorded diplomatic immunity.26 Article
IX provides that Panama shall recognize the property rights of
natural or juridical persons in real property in the Zone "as recognized by the United States."" Under the same article Panama
undertakes not to issue, adopt, or enforce any law or international
agreement which would interfere with the United States exercise
of rights granted under the Treaty.21 Article XI provides for a
thirty-month transition period during which the United States
would continue to maintain police protection and exercise criminal
jurisdiction. 9 Article XII commits the parties to study the feasibility of constructing a new sea-level canal or a third lane of locks."
Finally, article XIV addresses the settlement of disputes arising
under the Treaty. It refers back to the various consultative bodies
established under previous articles and stipulates that the parties
may resolve disputes through diplomatic channels or through arbitration.' In the Neutrality Treaty,2 the United States and Panama declare the Canal to be permanently neutral in order that
"both in time of peace and in time of war it shall remain secure
22. Id. art. 13, para. 4.
23. Id. art. 3, para. 5.
24. Id. art. 3, para. 6.
25. A symbolic indication of the change in Canal Zone status under the new
Treaty is the provision that the Panamanian flag will occupy the place of honor
at all times and in all places within Panama, whereas the United States flag will
only be flown at specified times and places. Canal Treaty, supra note 16, art. 7.
26. Id. art. 8, para. 2.
27. Id. art. 9, para. 3.
28. Id. art. 9, para. 8.
29. Id. art. 11, paras. 2, 3, 4.
30. Id. art. 12.
31. Id. art. 14.
32. Neutrality Treaty, supra note 16.
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and open to peaceful transit by the vessels of all nations on terms
of entire equality. 3 3 The technical rules governing passage under
the neutral regime are set out in article III. The United States role
in Canal defense is restricted by article V which states that upon
termination of the Canal Treaty in 1999 only Panama will maintain a military presence in the Canal. 34 Continuing United States
interest in the Canal is defined by article IV in which both parties
"agree to maintain the regime of neutrality." 3 This clause purportedly gives the United States a permanent right to defend the
Canal when its neutrality is threatened. The Protocol to the Neutrality Treaty provides that the signatories recognize the Canal's
permanent neutrality and agree to observe the rules governing
Canal use. 6 The Protocol will be opened to accession by all nations
by means of a joint United States-Panama resolution in the Organization of American States, pursuant to article VII of the Neutrality Treaty. 7
HI.

COMMENT

The most controversial aspect of the Panama Canal Treaties is
the issue of Canal neutrality and the United States right to intervene. The claim that the United States has the right to defend the
Canal under the Neutrality Treaty is based upon article IV: "The
United States of America and the Republic of Panama agree to
maintain the regime of neutrality established in this Treaty, which
shall be maintained in order that the Canal shall remain permanently neutral, notwithstanding the termination of any other treaties entered into by the two Contracting Parties. '3 Since the maintenance of Canal neutrality in the face of a military threat might
well require a military presence in the Canal area, and since the
Canal is Panamanian territory, the right of the United States to
maintain neutrality is in this context indistinguishable from a
right to intervene. The claim that the United States has such a
right under the Treaty is equivalent to a claim that the Republic
of Panama has consented to a restriction on her territorial sover33. Id. art. 2.
34. Id. art. 5.
35. Id. art. 4.
36. Protocol to Treaty Concerning the Permanent Neutrality and Operation
of The Panama Canal, arts. I, II, September 7, 1977, N.Y. Times, Sept. 7, 1977,
at A17, col. 5 [hereinafter cited as Protocol to Neutrality Treaty].
37. Id. art. 3 at A17, col. 6; Neutrality Treaty, supra note 16, art. 7.
38. Neutrality Treaty, supra note 16, art. 4.
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eignty. Since "[r]estrictions upon the independence of states cannot . . . be presumed,"39 and since this particular restriction permits unilateral intervention by another state, the proponents of the

interpretation that Panama has consented to such a restriction
must bear a heavy burden of persuasion." Article IV on its face is
incapable of supporting such a burden, especially when it is compared with the intervention provisions of other treaties. For exam-

ple, the Russia-Persia Treaty of Friendship of 1921 provides:
If a third party should attempt to carry out. . . armed intervention in Persia,. . . and if the Persian government should not be able
to put a stop to such menace after having been once called upon to
do so by Russia, Russia shall have the right to advance her troops
in the Persian interior for the purpose of carrying out operations
necessary for its defense.'
The Cyprus Treaty of Guarantee provides:
In so far as common and concerted action may not be possible [in
maintaining the security and neutrality of Cyprus], each of the
three guaranteeing powers reserves the right to take action with the
sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the present
Treaty.2
The Anglo-Egyptian Agreement Regarding the Suez Canal Base
provides: "In the event of an armed attack by an outside power
[on Egypt] Egypt shall afford to the United Kingdom such facilities as may be necessary in order to place the base on a war footing
and operate it effectively." 43 The Neutrality Treaty is much less
39.

S.S. Lotus, [1927] P.C.I.J., Ser. A, No. 9, at 18. See also 1 L.
LAW 257 (H. LAuTERPAcHT ed. 1948) (1948).

OPPENHEIM

INTERNATIONAL

40.

".

.

. the first and foremost restriction imposed by international law upon

a State is that-failing the existence of a permissive rule to the contrary-it may
not exercise its power in any form in the territory of another State." Id. at 18.
41. Treaty of Friendship, Feb. 26, 1921, Russia-Persia, art. 6, 9 L.N.T.S. 383,
403. The Treaty was renewed in 1927. In 1958 and 1959 the Soviet Union made
public statements re-affirming its validity, but Iran objected on the basis of
changed circumstances. F. DE LimA, INTERvENTON IN INTERNATIONAL LAw, 110-11
(1971).
42. Treaty of Guarantee, Aug. 16, 1960, Greece, Turkey, Great BritainCyprus, 382 U.N.T.S. 3, [1961] Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 5 (Cmd. 1253). During the
1963 civil war between Greek and Turkish ethnic groups, two of the signatories,
Greece and Turkey, threatened to intervene. Before any such intervention occurred, the third signatory, the United Kingdom, put the issue before the United
Nations. F. DE LImA, supra note 41, at 113.
43. Agreement Regarding the Suez Canal Base, Oct. 19, 1954, Great BritainEgypt, 225 U.N.T.S. 292, [1955] Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 67 (Cmd. 9586). In conse-
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specific. Under the Neutrality Treaty the United States neither
"reserves the right"" nor "shall have the right"45 of intervention.
It merely agrees "to maintain the regime of neutrality."" Such
language is at best ambiguous. In determining the meaning of
ambiguous treaty terms, international tribunals generally look to
the preamble, other terms of the same document, and the terms
of related documents." The Neutrality Treaty has no preamble but
reference can be made to the Canal Treaty preamble, which states
that the parties came to their agreement "[aictingin the spirit"
of the 1974 Joint Statement and "[a]cknowledging the Republic
of Panama's sovereignty over its territory ... ."" Since the Joint
Statement stipulates, and the preamble acknowledges, Panamanian sovereignty over the Canal, it is hard to find any support in
the preamble for the proposition that the parties intended to limit
that sovereignty by granting a right of intervention. Furthermore,
the article V provision that only Panama will maintain a military
presence in the Canal after the year 199941 suggests otherwise.
Although the United States has no basis for a right of intervention assertion under the textual, or objective, analysis, the prevailing international practice is to take a more subjective or "intent
of the parties" approach. 0 Using this approach it is appropriate to
look to the travaux preparatoireswhen textual analysis falls to
resolve an ambiguity. 51 Part of the travaux preparatoiresof the
Neutrality Treaty is the previously rejected 1967 draft, which provided that the United States "shall have the right to act to ensure
quence of the Anglo-French intervention in 1956, Egypt denounced the Agreement in 1957. F. DE LimA, supra note 41, at 112.
44. Treaty of Friendship, supra note 41.
45. Treaty of Guarantee, supra note 42.
46. Neutrality Treaty, supra note 16, art. 4.
47. See South West Africa Cases, [1966] I.C.J. 6, 15, 23; Advisory Opinion
on Convention Concerning Employment of Women During the Night, [1932]
P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 50, at 373; Advisory Opinion on Competence of the International Labour Organisation, [1926] P.C.I.J., ser. B, No. 13, at 14-17.
48. Joint Statement, supra note 15 (emphasis added).
49. Neutrality Treaty, supra note 16, art. 5.
50. This approach is codified in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27 (1969). The
United States signed on April 24, 1970, but the Senate has not given its advice
and consent.
51. I. SINCAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAw OF TRAFrms 71 (1973).
See also Advisory Opinion on Convention Concerning Employment of Women
During the Night, [1932] P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 50, at 383-88 (Anzilotti, J.
dissenting); South West Africa Cases, [1966] I.C.J. 6, 20, 45.

622

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 10:615

Canal Defense." 5 Only actions affecting areas "outside the Defense Areas" were to be subject to consultation.5 3 The rejection of
the draft treaty by Panama on the grounds that it gave the United
States a right to intervene54 argues against any inference that the
parties intended to establish such a right in the present Treaty.
Nor does the Joint Statement of 1974 support any such inference.
The Joint Statement provision that "Panama shall grant to the
United States the rights necessary to . . . protect and defend the
Canal" has reference to a treaty which is to have a "fixed termination date."5 5 The Panama Canal Treaty has a "protect and defend"
provision and a fixed termination date; 8 the Neutrality Treaty has
neither. Thus the intent to grant defense rights applies only to the
Canal Treaty and not the Neutrality Treaty. A statement which
does apply to the Neutrality Treaty was made by President Carter
and General Torrijos on October 15, 1977, in Washington, D.C."7
The probative weight of the statement is subject to some question
since it was not signed, an official joint text was not released, and
it was made after the Treaty had been signed." Furthermore, it
does not provide an answer because the statement itself is ambiguous. It states that the United States has "the right to act against
any aggression or threat directed against the Canal . . . ," but it
also asserts that such right "does not mean, nor shall it be interpreted as a right of intervention of the United States in the internal
affairs of Panama. Any United States action will be directed at
insuring that the Canal will remain open. . . , and it shall never
be directed against the territorial integrity or political independence of Panama."5 The statement seems to limit the United States
to actions necessary to the defense of the Canal short of intervention in Panama's internal affairs. The problem with this distinction is that the class of actions "directed at insuring that the Canal
remain open" overlaps the class of actions which infringe upon the
52. Treaty on the Defense of the Panama Canal and of its Neutrality, art. 2,
§ 1, reprinted in HOUSE REPORT, supra note 9, app. 6.

53. Id. art. 2, § 2.
54.
55.
56.

HOUSE REPORT, supra note 9, app. 9.

Joint Statement, supra note 15, arts. 2, 6.
Canal Treaty, supra note 16, art. 4, § 2, art. 2, § 2.

57. Statement by President Carter of the United States and General Omar
Torrijos of the Republic of Panama, N.Y. Times, October 15, 1977, at 8

[hereinafter cited as Carter-Torrijos Statement].
58. Cf. Joint Statement, supra note 15, which was signed by Henry Kissinger
and Juan Antonio Tack.
59. Carter-Torrijos Statement, supra note 57.
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"territorial integrity or political independence" of Panama. Effective military defense of the Canal may well require action within
Panamanian territory; however, such action would be a prima
facie violation of Panama's territorial integrity. Various arguments
can be made that a short term intervention for limited purposes
would not violate territorial integrity. First, without an intent on
the part of the United States to permanently annex the territory,
the distinction could be drawn between territorial integrity, which
is not violated by intervention, and territorial inviolability, which
is."6 Since, arguendo, states have no right to territorial inviolability
to begin with,"1 there is no contradiction in sayifg the United
States can intervene but may not violate Panama's territorial integrity. The reply to this argument is that under the United Nations Charter, to which both Panama and the United States are
parties, territorial integrity is synonymous with territorial inviolability, except in cases of self-defense and enforcement of Charter
provisions. The terms must be synonyms, or there would have been
no purpose to coupling "political independence" to "territorial integrity" under the article 2 prohibition against the use of force. 2
Since United States intervention to defend the Canal would not be
an exercise of self-defense or enforcement of Charter provisions,
such action would be a violation of Panama's territorial integrity.
Second, even if the distinction between inviolability and integrity
could be maintained, it would still be subject to the objection that
insofar as it requires an analysis of intent, it is judicially unworkable. Finally, the argument that the Neutrality Treaty gives the
United States a right of intervention is based on the premise that
treaties must be interpreted so as to give effect to their underlying
purposes. Since the underlying purpose of the Neutrality Treaty
is the preservation of Canal neutrality, and since arguably that
purpose can only be achieved if the United States has a right of
intervention, the Treaty must have granted that right. Even if the
premises are admitted, however, the conclusion cannot be supported. International tribunals are cautious in implying legal
rights from general treaty purposes. In the South West Africa
Cases,63 Ethiopa and Liberia brought suit against the Union of
South Africa for alleged violation of the League of Nations Mandate for South West Africa. The plaintiffs argued that the provi60. D. BowE-r, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, 31, 33-34 (1958).
61. Id. at 31.
62. U.N. CHARTER, art. 2, para. 4; 2 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 39, at 154 (1948).
63. South West Africa Cases, [1966] I.C.J. 6.

624

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 10:615

sions of the Mandate should not become ineffective by reason of
the League's dissolution but should be given continuing effect
through members of the United Nations. The argument that plaintiffs, as members of the United Nations, should have a legal right
of action against South Africa was rejected by the International
Court of Justice. The Court stated that to imply a right of action
would "exceed the bounds of normal judicial action."64 If a right
of action cannot be implied, certainly the right of intervention
cannot be implied."5 The same flaw can be found in the argument
that the United States, as a user of an inter-oceanic waterway
dedicated to international use, shares with all other user states an
interest in the waterway and therefore may act on behalf of all in
protecting that shared interest through intervention." This argument attempts to convert an interest into a right without an adequate legal premise. At present, no such right exists in international law." The right which does exist for users of inter-oceanic
waterways dedicated to international use is the right of free passage,68 which is not the same as a right of intervention. Thus, while
an attempt to force passage through the Canal contrary to Panama's wishes would be legal, an attempt to seize the Canal in order
to defend it would not.
The assumption underlying both sides of the intervention argument is that the meaning of neturality as applied to the Canal is
clear. Historically, canal neutrality has meant that when the canal
sovereign 9 is neutral, the sovereign does not interfere with free
passage. 0 When the canal sovereign is belligerent, however, neutral canals have, without exception, been closed to enemy ships,
64. "[Tjhe Court cannot remedy a deficiency if, in order to do so, it has to
exceed the bounds of normal judicial action." Id. at 48.
65. "In the international field, the existence of obligations that cannot in the
last resort be enforced by any legal process, has always been the rule rather than
the exception .... " Id. at 45. Pre-Treaty proposals for neutrality enforcement
mechanisms are found in ABA REPORT, supranote 3, at 88-94, and in R. BAXTER,

314 (1964).
66. Hints at an analogous argument were made by the United Kingdom during the 1956 Suez crisis, F. DE LIMA, supra note 41, at 91.
67. The argument "amounts to a plea that the Court should allow the equivalent of an 'actio popularis,' or right resident in any member of a community to

THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS

take legal action in vindication of a public interest ...a right of this kind...
is not known to international law as it stands at present." [1966] I.C.J. at 47.

68. R.

BAXTER,supra note

65, at 182-84 (1964).

69. Or the power acting as "if it were the sovereign," as is the case with the
Panama Canal under the Hay-Bunau Varilla Treaty, supra note 4.

70. ABA REPORT, supra note 3, at 70.
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notwithstanding treaty clauses to the contrary. 7' If historical practice is the basis for the legal definition as well as the practical
meaning of canal neutrality provisions, Panama has the right
under the Treaty to close the Canal to her enemies in wartime. If
the legal definition of neutrality is taken to be consistent with the
literal terms of the Treaty, Panama has no right to close the Canal
to ships of any state at any time. Regardless of the definition used,
however, it is clear that the United States alone will have no right
to close the Canal under the Treaty. This conclusion must stand
even if a right of intervention under the Treaty is admitted, since
such a right can only be exercised to preserve neutrality as defined
by the Treaty.
Given its strategic interest in the Canal, it might well be asked
why the United States would sign a Treaty which does not give an
unambiguous right of intervention. Under the Treaty, the United
States has at best only a weak legal justification for intervention,
which will be useful in domestic politics should the popular opposition to "giving the Canal away" become critical, but which will be
much less convincing elsewhere. World opinion is suspicious of the
reliance of any great power on intervention, regardless of the legal
rationale. The justification will be least persuasive in Latin America where there is deep resentment against the United States for
past intervention in the area. 72 On the other hand, this resentment
is another reason the United States did not secure an unambiguous
right to intervene-after the 1964 riots and the 1967 coup, no Panamanian leader could have agreed to such a provision. A political
realist would suggest that the United States will probably take
whatever action it deems necessary for national security regardless
of legal ramifications, hence the failure to secure the right to intervene should not prevent ratification if'the Treaty serves other national interests. Indeed, there are good foreign policy reasons for
ratifying it. In view of the mounting popular resentment in Panama over the United States presence in the isthmus, it may be wise
for the United States to withdraw gradually. The Treaties allow
the United States to do so without losing face. Therefore, good
diplomacy may be reason enough for the United States to agree to
terms which severely restrict its legal rights. If the United States
can avoid possible military entanglement in Panama and begin to
71.
72.

Id. at 60-65, 72, 73.
E.g.; the Bay of Pigs and Dominican Republic interventions, R.
NONINTERVENTION AND INTERNATIONAL ORDER 199-203 (1974).

VINCENT,
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clear the way, after years of ill will, for a genuine "new relationship,''" the new Treaties should be ratified.
David M. Himmelreich

73.

Canal Treaty, supra note 16, at Preamble.

